A little over halfway through the season and Arsenal currently find themselves sixth in the Premier League table (with a game in hand). 34 points from 20 games makes this one of Arsene Wenger’s worst ever points tallies at this stage of the season, although 13 points from the last 5 games has seen them steadily moving in the right direction. A worrying factor prevalent in most of their matches is striking a balance between attack and defence. On one hand, they comfortably scored 7 goals against a weary Newcastle United side but also shipped in 3. On the other hand, they struggled to score goals against relegation candidates like Wigan and Southampton (against whom they scored 6 at home).
Wenger has always been a stubborn man when it comes to changing tactics or formations according to the opponents and would rather have his team play the unidirectional Arsenal way, albeit with some tactical switches during the game. But over the years, even the weaker teams have found ways to stop Arsenal from playing their possession game causing them to struggle with unlocking otherwise fragile defences. In some games, more than the formation, it’s the right tactics coupled with the wrong combination of players that is causing the system to fail. So how can Wenger tackle this problem?
The 4-2-3-1 Formation
This has been Arsenal’s standard formation ever since the 2008/09 season (a variation of the 4-3-3). It was built around Cesc Fabregas operating at the top of a midfield three, supported by two deep lying midfielders who worked in a double pivot role. The best midfield combination that suited this formation was Jack Wilshere and Alex Song behind Fabregas. This formation allowed either Song or Wilshere to join the attack while the other sat back to defend, with the two constantly switching positions during the game.
The current midfield has Santi Cazorla at the tip, operating between the opponents’ defence and midfield, with Mikel Arteta and Wilshere in the double pivot role (Arteta playing the deepest). Wilshere’s return revitalized a stagnant midfield and his ability to quickly change the direction of attack was the key behind transitioning from defence to attack. His marauding runs through the midfield allowed an unmarked Cazorla to move into space and be more involved in the build-up and the goals. But one key factor that has been overlooked is the lack of a physical holding midfielder at the back (like Vieira or Song) to break up play when Arsenal loses possession. Arteta, for all his exceptional passing skills and positioning, isn’t the ideal candidate.
The front three work best with Olivier Giroud playing as the centre forward. Although Walcott has been literally clamouring in the press about his insistence to play as the main striker (the “footballing reason” behind his contract negotiations stalemate), it is definitely not the ideal position for him. It only works for him when the opponents play a high line and when he can use his pace to beat the centre backs. It does NOT work against organized defences who sit deep. Walcott isn’t a physical force in the box, which takes crosses out of the equation. He cannot hold up play to bring midfielders into the picture. His selfishness (and at times his frustrating decision making) has seen Arsenal squander chances they should have scored from. Meanwhile, Giroud ticks all the boxes required of a central striker – wins aerial duels, can drop deep to hold up play and can also shoot with both feet.
The formation relies on the full backs to offer width on the flanks, stretching defences and allowing Podolski and Walcott to get into the box to provide a numerical advantage. It also asks a lot of Podolski and Walcott to help out Gibbs and Sagna on defence respectively. Gibbs isn’t one of the best defenders but offers a lot in attack which has helped Podolski rack up goals and assists playing out on the left. Another option on the flank is the young and pacy Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain.
The 4-4-2 Formation
Wenger once said, “With a 4-4-2, 60% of your players are occupying 60% of the pitch. No other formation is as efficient at covering space.” The 4-4-2 hasn’t been used much by Wenger since the he switched to the 4-2-3-1 formation. This formation requires two midfielders who can aid Arsenal’s passing game and at the same time break up play on defence. Perhaps Arsenal’s best midfield duo post the ‘Invincibles’ era was that of Fabregas and Mathieu Flamini. The formation did not rely on traditional wingers. Rather, creative players were deployed on the wings; ones with good dribbling skills who could also dart into the box and share the goal scoring burden.
With the current line-up, a 4-4-2 (or a 4-4-1-1) is possible. The sooner Walcott understands that he carries a much bigger threat when he comes in from the flank, ably supported by the full back or a midfielder, the better for him and Arsenal as a whole. His pace is deadlier on the flank than through the centre. Again, the fullbacks play an important role.
A 4-4-2 will see Cazorla playing in the “Bergkamp role” (comparisons with the ‘Invincibles’ obviously crop up because the formation was so successful), pressurizing midfielders when they lose the ball with Wilshere or Arteta playing the role of the attacking midfielder. This means that the other midfielder (CDM) will have to be the physical holding midfielder. If ever a time came to replace Alex Song, it is now – while the Januray transfer window is still open. Arteta has played every single Premier League game this season and Wilshere has just come back from a long lay-off. Looking at the number of fixtures to be played, they could do with the rotation.
An experimental 3-4-1-2?
A 3-4-1-2 formation would entail the use of three centre backs to form the back line and instead of two full backs; the team would have two wing backs. The wing backs would play almost alongside the two defensive midfielders. The presence of energetic, quick wing backs (with oodles of stamina) on the flanks provides a lot of width in attack and extra defenders when they lose the ball. This also negates the opponents’ wingers who are torn between attacking and providing support for their full back. And with two strikers playing up front, the entire defensive back line becomes stretched if the wingers don’t provide adequate defensive support.
Cazorla would once again be the principal playmaker. Walcott would get his chance to play up front, in tandem with Giroud. Again, this formation requires a ‘beast’ of a player as a central midfielder to play alongside Wilshere or Arteta. Andre Santos, who is arguably unfit to play as a left back in the Premier League can actually flourish as a wing back as he’s pretty good going forward, can shoot if required and is at ease with Arsenal’s one touch passing game. It may come in handy when searching for important goals while shoring up at the back, but a drastic change of this magnitude in the formation is highly unlikely.