World Cup 2018: 5 reasons for Germany’s exit

#4 Stale Tactics

Joachim Low

Like their 2014 World Cup final opponents Argentina (at least in their first game), Germany’s tactics have grown stale. Joachim Low has played a version of his 4-2-3-1 for the past eight years. In fact in Germany’s opening game against Mexico, Low played five of the same starting XI as the 2010 World Cup quarterfinal against Argentina and seven of the same starting XI as the 2014 World Cup semifinal against Brazil. Even Low’s replacements are like for like replacements-Joshua Kimmich for Philipp Lahm, Jonas Hector for Benedikt Howedes and Werner for Klose (theoretically at least).

The only real tactical change that Low has made is playing an attacking midfielder (Draxler or Marco Reus) instead of Bastian Schweinsteiger- allowing Toni Kroos to move back into central midfield. That has only exposed Germany to counter-attacks (more on that later). While Germany’s fast attacking 4-2-3-1 was refreshing in 2010, even the best tactics grow stale over eight years.

Mexico, Sweden and South Korea’s managers are too clever not to understand Germany’s formation and how to best exploit it. Mexico chose to focus on the counter-attack while South Korea focused on defending compactly in the centre of park- realizing that most of Germany’s attacks came through that area. It is little wonder that Germany’s best period in the World Cup came when they switched to a 4-4-2 in the second half against Sweden. That formation may not have been the most ideal considering the makeup of the squad yet the change was enough to perturb the Scandinavians.

There was no need for Germany to make any major changes to their tactics or philosophy. After all the system had worked brilliantly over the best part of the past decade. However, some changes could have made a difference- perhaps playing Gomez up front (adding an aerial dimension to their attack) or switching to a three man defence. Anything really, would have been better than the same old stale 4-2-3-1.