How Swansea exposed Manchester United's lack of midfield balance

Following Manchester United’s FA Cup exit to Swansea City last weekend, criticism poured in from national and regional newspapers, rival fans smirked, and social media exploded with discontent and gloating in equal measure. David Moyes cut a dejected figure at full-time, walking towards the Old Trafford tunnel under the ever-present and ever-watchful eye of the now retired Sir Alex Ferguson who, during his glittering 26-year spell in charge of United, had suffered elimination at the third round only once.

The club’s greatest ever manager knows only too well that amongst the positives and history defining moments, coaching the world-famous Red Devils can be a fiery, torturous and unforgiving Hell.

Man United have a chance to correct their mistakes when the two teams face each other in the Premier League on the 11th of January, less than a week after their previous encounter. Swansea City may have dealt the first blow, but due to the matches taking place in such a short timescale, and at the same venue, can United learn anything tactically from their FA Cup defeat in order to exact revenge?

Outnumbered in Midfield

Less than five minutes into their cup defeat, it was clear that Moyes’ tried and tested 4-4-1-1 formation was going to face an uphill task in controlling and shackling the fluidity of Michael Laudrup’s 4-2-3-1. The former Everton manager’s chosen shape doesn’t, unless otherwise instructed, place players between the lines. And the possibility of containing the roving movements of three inventive central midfielders, with two of his own, was always going to be tough.

Moyes can frequently be heard barking instructions from the touchline in an attempt to construct, and maintain, two rigid and organised lines of four in front of goal. In his mind, these units should advance and retreat throughout the defensive and attacking transitions, with one player – Danny Welbeck in this instance – drifting between the lines in close proximity to the lone striker; a methodical approach that can work at any level of the footballing pyramid. However, within Moyes’ chosen philosophy lies an abundance of weaknesses that can be exploited by any number of 4-2-3-1 variants. And so it proved.

Based on Swansea’s passing direction – near total avoidance of the left flank – it appeared Laudrup’s pre-match strategy, perhaps, was to overload the inexperiencedAlexander Büttner due to Shinji Kagawa craving a central location at any opportunity. By utilising Alejandro Pozuelo as a willing runner into the channels, bypassing a zone that, in modern football is often home to a menacing holding player, Darren Fletcherhad to retreat and track the Spaniard’s advances (see image above), out of fear of one of the central defenders being pulled out of position. In truth, the situation left Fletcher in two minds: let Pozuelo run into vacant space, or follow him himself, which would ultimately drag the Scottish international deeper, thus exposing central midfield as indicated above.

Right Flank Troubles

While Man United struggled to control Swansea’s fluid movement throughout central zones, they had similar difficulties in trying to contain the opposition’s advances down the right flank.

Jonathan de Guzmán and Jonjo Shelvey regularly swapped positions in midfield, while Dwight Tiendalli surged forward into acres of available space and Kagawa tucked inside. The Japanese playmaker has a great number of admirers, though his natural game is to attack from the left and drift into space behind the striker, which can be viewed as a great asset, but whenever possession is lost the ex-Borussia Dortmund player’s lacklustre positional sense frequently exposes United’s left-back.

On a slightly positive note, Kagawa’s movement allowed United to maintain a level of possession throughout midfield as the second half drew to a close. At times, the 24-year-old opened up a number of new passing lanes as he linked with the strikers, creating a central triangle, although his overall contribution was insignificant. Knowing how Moyes likes his teams to set up, Kagawa’s wayward positioning would be deemed cause for concern when possession is lost.Overload & Rapid Transition

Welbeck is appreciated by Moyes for his hard work and versatility up front, with the ability to lead the line, retreat to midfield, make challenges and even play out wide if needed. It was for these reasons that the England youngster was given the unenviable task of marking Swansea’s two holding players (see below). However, drawing on my understanding of basic mathematics, one player can’t mark and control the movement of two players. It’s impossible.

The 23-year-old’s job would have been far easier if Fletcher and Tom Cleverley had been able to mark the other midfielders, creating 3v3. But due to the fluid movement of Shelvey, de Guzmán and Wayne Routledge, Welbeck’s simple tactical instruction proved extremely difficult.

All three of Swansea’s attacking players took it in turns to stand within the alluring space directly in front of United’s back-four (see above), meaning that at any given time, central midfield was overloaded by five to three in the visitor’s favour.

It was via this tactical outnumbering that Swansea City took the lead.

The images show that Cleverley has decided to leave the centre circle to harassChico Flores, while Fletcher marks Shelvey. Swansea’s lone striker, Wilfried Bony, has withdrawn from the front into the hole, and as both of United’s midfielders are currently preoccupied, Rio Ferdinand makes the split-second decision to leave his defensive position in order to track the Ivorian striker’s run. Bony reaches the ball first and passes to the feet of Pozuelo, who fires it behind Jonny Evans into the path of the onrushing Routledge. Textbook pass and move.

In hindsight, the goal may have been prevented had United fielded a holding player – Bony’s run would have been tracked by the defensive midfielder and Ferdinand would have held his position for the diagonal run of Routledge.

All in all, the opening goal exposed a number of tactical problems that can occur in today’s modern game when facing a 4-2-3-1 without a ‘water carrier’. The ability to control central midfield is vital for any side, but the ease at which Swansea could place bodies in front of United’s defence (see below) – the most dangerous location on the pitch – will undoubtedly be alarming to Moyes and his backroom staff ahead of Saturday’s 5.30 pm rematch. Especially as it was a strategy utilised by the Swans throughout the full 90 minutes.

Time and time again, they initiated attacks by playing the ball to Bony’s feet, making sure a runner surged into space either side of Evans or Ferdinand as United’s defenders moved forward to pressurise. Simple, sharp transitions that sliced the Red Devils open with ease.

The centre of the pitch was also a problem for the home side when attempting to break Swansea’s pressing. Cleverley endeavoured to ease the defender’s distribution, in an effort to regain control of the match, but his thoughtfulness only left one passing option in midfield – Fletcher (see below). Even the best teams in world football would struggle to increase or maintain possession with such a blank canvas.

With an unfortunate injury list that swells by the week, along with the glaringly obvious midfield weakness when facing a 4-2-3-1 formation, it could be another lonely night for Moyes at the Theatre of Nightmares come Saturday.