The next set includes van Ginkel, Lampard, Luiz, and McEachran. Luiz is a real conundrum here: is he a centre back? Yes. But can he just remain stationary in central midfield like Mikel? No. Does he time his runs like Lampard? No. But he has an equal vision compared to Lampard in picking out a pass. Luiz is a mix of everything – Ramires, Mikel and Lampard.
McEachran meanwhile, like Oscar, would prefer to play as a central midfielder of any role. We have not seen much of van Ginkel yet, so adding him to the mix would make things even more of a mystery.
The attacking 4-3-3 and the flat 4-3-3 are yet to be looked into. For starters, the attacking 4-3-3 makes better use of the talents of Lampard, Oscar, Hazard, Mata, Piazon and De Bruyne, while more defence-minded players like Mikel, Luiz, or Ake are sure to thrive in the flat one.
The 4-3-3 clinches it. With three variants, there is more scope to change the midfield mid-game. The squad right now has too many players capable of playing too many sets of positions.
One set consists of the centre forward, who can drift wide (and vice versa), the attacking midfielder, who likes to go wide sometimes (and vice versa), the forward who likes to drop into the CAM’s area, followed by the central midfielders capable of playing wide when required, and lastly, the central midfielders who can both hold defence and support the striker.
Another set comes to mind – holding players who can fill in as defenders, namely Luiz and Essien. The probable signing of De Rossi, which had become so crucial according to Part 1 of this article, is not at all required now. Money saved!
In the case of the 4-2-3-1, the scope for this amount of flexibility is limited. The wide player in the ’3′ here is more withdrawn than the wide forward in the 4-3-3. This would classify him as a midfielder rather than a striker, something that players like Torres and Lukaku would not enjoy.
The one forward is static, with almost no chance of changing to another role. The trio has to be chosen from a roster of up to 10 players; a similar argument for the double pivot. Thus, the 4-2-3-1 requires team selection by layers – two in the double pivot, and three behind the striker.
The 4-3-3 meanwhile gets rid of this layer-wise selection because all that the manager has to do here is choose five players from 18, ask two of them to start wide to support one static forward and three of them to scroll through the variants in midfield. The 4-2-3-1 does not have many significant variants, which the 4-3-3 does.
With this apparent depth for every position (‘apparent’ because players’ roles may intersect; that is, if a player is listed as a candidate for one position, he may also be found in another list of positions), squad depth is utilised to its fullest.
The opponent will have a really hard time figuring out the starting XI, and once the team is put out, the variant of the formation becomes a question for the opposition. The formation can even be rotated between its three variants mid-game, which will make the team even more unpredictable.
This would put any man-marking assignments to shame (as it would be extremely difficult to cope if the player who he is supposed to mark starts wide, then suddenly moves into a defensive midfield position).
Man-marking compromises the opponents’ shape. For each man-marking assignment of the opponents, one position is left free to exploit. Once the man-marker is negated, the opponents are effectively reduced to ten men. Technically, the opponents are outnumbered, and the space left by the marker can be exploited by a quick transition.
The 4-2-3-1 has had its day at Chelsea, and should make way for a more fluid, dynamic, extremely dangerous, and ever changing 4-3-3. This is the way forward as it makes maximum use of each and every player’s utility. Let’s hope the Special One thinks the same way and implements it to devastating success.
You can read part one here: Mourinho and the Chelsea formation debate – Part 1